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Abstract
This paper proposes a reduced form model of dynamic duopoly in the
context of heterogeneous innovations framework. Two agents invest into ex-
pansion of variety of available products and into the improvement of quality
of existing products simultaneously. Every newly introduced product has
its own dimension of quality-improving innovations and there is a contin-
uum of possible new products. In the area of quality innovations the costless
imitation effect is modelled while in the area of variety expanding innova-
tions agents are cooperating with each other. As a result the specialization of
innovative activity is observed. This specialization arises from strategic in-
teractions of agents in both fields of innovative activity and is endogenously
defined from the dynamics of the model.
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1 Introduction
It is widely known, that modern firms have multiple research projects with some
of them being more directed onto new products creation while others being di-
rected on the improvement of existing ones. It is also known, that some firms tend
to specialize more in products creation while the other in the improvements of
existing products. Current paper tries to provide an insight into the mechanism,
which defines the direction and degree of specialization of R&D activities of such
multiproduct firms.
The main focus of the paper is thus on the modelling of strategic interactions
of agents in the field of innovations. To this end the production activities of the
agents is not explicitly modelled. Only the investment activities related to the in-
troduction of new products and their further refinement are accounted for. It is
assumed, that there exists a continuum of potential products which may be in-
vented (introduced) and each of these products may be further improved through
innovations, specific for each such a new product. Creation of new products is
related to product innovations and improvement of quality of each new product is
related to process innovations in the literature. Both types of innovations require
specific types of investments. Such a view on innovations is in line with definition
of vertical and horizontal innovations as put in (Rosenkranz 2003). In particu-
lar, the notion of variety expanding and quality improving innovations follow the
setup of vertical and horizontal innovations of (Peretto and Connolly 2007).
Both agents participate in the joint R&D partnership devoted to the creation
of new products and may use freely these newly created products in their further
activities. At the same time each new product may be further improved in its
characteristics (referred to as “quality” throughout the paper) separately by each of
the agents. Such a structure assumes joint lab financing for fundamental research
(products creation) while quality improving process is managed privately by each
agent. For all the new products this quality characteristic is zero for both agents
at the time of product’s creation. However, due to possibly different efficiencies
of investments into the development of the products qualities, eventually one of
the agents may become the leader in this quality development. In this case I allow
for undirected technological spillover between agents: at each time when one of
the agents has lower quality for a given product, she benefits from partial spillover
from the development of this product’s quality by the other agent. Thus the model
under analysis allows for both symmetric (no leader-follower situation occur) and
non-symmetric outcomes with technological spillovers being included as well as
for catching-up in quality improvements.
This framework allows to catch several major issues relevant for dynamic
interactions in the field of innovations. First, it is shown that the technology
spillovers in the form of costless imitation do not lead to the incentive to de-
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crease investments into qualities of products for both agents simultaneously (as it
should be in the case of only one direction of innovations being considered) if one
would account for their cooperation on the more fundamental level of creation of
new products. One of the agents, which eventually becomes the leader (due to
higher quality investments efficiency), does not benefit from the spillover effect,
while the other one positions herself as a follower, reducing her own investments
to benefit from this technological spillover created by the activities of the first
agent.
Next, in the direction of variety expansion the united efforts of both agents are
distributed unevenly. Instead, there is a natural specialization of investment activi-
ties of both agents. The agent, who is benefiting from the technology spillovers in
process innovations (named “the follower” in the sequel of the paper) puts more
investments into the product introduction activities. However, in the simplest case
of open-loop strategies the other agent invests non-zero amount into the product
creation also. In an effect the agent who is the most efficient in one or another
type of innovative activities carries the major burden of investments in this direc-
tion while benefiting from the investments of the other agent in the other type of
innovations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section a brief sum-
mary on relevant studies is presented. Next the formal setup of the model is de-
scribed. It is solved sequentially through employing the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
and Maximum Principle approaches. After obtaining analytical results the dy-
namics of the optimal investment strategies for both agents are considered and the
nature and form of the resulting strategic interactions as well as some practical
implications of the findings are discussed.
2 Related Research
One of the first works on the influence of the market structure on the outcome
of R&D competition is (Loury 1979). In this pioneering work the discrete sin-
gle innovation is assumed and n firms compete for being the first to introduce
the new product. The first firm which would introduce such a product obtains
an exclusive right for its production and hence receives the perpetual stream of
profits associated with this product. Attempts to model the strategic interactions
of oligopolistic agents via the differential games approach followed in works like
(Reinganum 1982). In this paper the author combined static games approach with
optimal control one to obtain the dynamic game of R&D competition in a n-firm
industry.
There exists broad literature on the effects of imitation on innovation activity.
One of the examples is the work of Gallini,(Gallini 1992), but imitation there is
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costly and the model is static. Another more recent work on dynamic interactions
of R&D firms is that of Judd, (Judd 2003). In this paper the author analyses the
multi-stage innovative race between multiple agents with multi-product situation
and this is rather close to the suggested approach. He finds out, that there is
an ambiguity in the results of a game, namely a given player may increase his
expenditure when the other agent is ahead of him, while this is not profitable for
him as an imitator.
The recent paper on product and process innovations in differential games
framework (Lambertini and Mantovani 2010) assumes fully dynamical model of
the duopoly competition of innovating firms. However, this paper does not handle
heterogeneity of innovations and hence is reduced to the differential game with
two states, while the current paper allows for distributed nature of innovations
and all products differ from each other in their investment characteristics. This is
more in line with the setup of Lin, (Lin 2004), but with fully dynamic context.
The last feature of the suggested model is the R&D cooperation on the level of
products variety expansion (product innovations). It is argued that such a situation
is more typical for R&D firms then the full-scale competition on both levels. First
such a type of strategic interactions has been considered in (D’Aspremont and
Jacquemin 1988), where it is argued that in real economies the majority of R&D
activities is performed in the form of joint R&D ventures if one would consider
innovations of big enough size.
One may consider the suggested model as an extension and combination of
these results from different directions. First, it contributes to the line of literature
on strategic interactions between innovating agents in the spirit of (Reinganum
1982), (Judd 2003) and works by Lambertini and co-authors, like (Cellini and
Lambertini 2002), (Lambertini and Mantovani 2010). These approaches are ex-
tended by considering the distributed parameter model and formulating the fully
dynamical differential game with richer strategic sets for both players. The model
also assumes explicitly the heterogeneous nature of innovations, that is, all of the
new products are different from each other in the degree, to which their quality
may be improved and how much efforts this would require.
Next, models of imitation, (Gallini 1992) and R&D joint ventures, (D’Aspremont
and Jacquemin 1988), (Rosenkranz 2003) are combined in a single model and it
is demonstrated that these two effects are complementary in nature and resulting
strategies cannot be optimal in a dynamic context while taking into account only
one of them. The paper follows the result of Rosenkranz on efficiency of R&D
cartels in terms of innovations output, but extends them by accounting for dis-
tributed model with continuum of research projects being pursued simultaneously
and allow for technological spillovers also.
The setup with heterogeneous continuous spectrum of innovations have been
used in (Belyakov, Tsachev, and Veliov 2011) and (Bondarev 2012). Both papers
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do not consider multiple agents and their strategic interactions and are one-agent
optimization models. The current paper builds up upon the results of (Bondarev
2012). The same formal framework of innovations is assumed, but the analysis
is carried out for two agents instead of one and the focus is on the dynamic in-
teractions between these agents, rather then on the dynamics of innovations for a
monopolist. It is demonstrated, that under full cooperation the current model is
reduced to the single monopolist’s model of this paper. Moreover, if no techno-
logical spillover occur (in symmetric case), the model reduces to two independent
monopolists problems of the same type. Thus the presented paper is a natural ex-
tension of this previous work in the field. The generation of innovations under the
assumed partial R&D partnership is higher, then under both full cooperation case
and for two independent monopolies.
3 The Model
3.1 Form of strategic interaction between agents
In this paper it is assumed, that agents follow the incomplete cooperation pattern.
They cooperate in joint R&D projects for new products creation (thus having the
single lab for their projects) while develop these new products separately. At
the same time, they may benefit from technological spillovers from each other’s
activities in quality improvements. This exact situation can rarely be accounted
for in real industries. However the main point of the paper is to compare such
“what-if” situation with more frequently observed cases of full cooperation in
R&D and independent R&D activities.
In the framework of the model full cooperation between agents will lead to
the dynamic problem of a single unified agent, as long as market activities is
not taken into account. Thus no specialization and technological spillovers may
be observed. At the same time, if one would allow for independent products
creation activities, no technological spillovers would occur, since at each time
both agents would be developing different products and cannot coordinate their
imitation activities. The technological spillover effect appears exactly because of
joint R&D on the product development level: both agents have similar designs
and blueprints at the time of introduction of new product and thus may compare
their own quality improving efforts to those of the other agent. Then it would
be possible for the technologically backward agent to (almost) costlessly acquire
some information on the developments of the more advanced agent.
It is argued, that such a structure of R&D activities would be more beneficial in
terms of the total R&D output for both agents, since the specialization of activities
occur. This specialization cannot happen both in fully cooperative case and in
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the independent research case. This specific form of R&D interactions may be
observed in some industries, where initial product development requires a lot of
investments, while further development of product lines is not that costly and
may be handled by separate individual firms. The most close example would be
the pharmaceutical industry, where only few basic active substances exist and are
developed by large joint ventures, while every company develops its own design
of medicals on the basis of these basic substances.
The suggested model does not include market competition, which, of course,
may substantially change the comparative benefits of different forms of R&D co-
operation. If one would allow for the agents under consideration to co-exist at
the same market, the technological spillover in the quality innovations may be
actually more harmful for profits of the technological leader, than under current
setup. To this end the agents under consideration are considered to be local re-
gional monopolies which do not compete on the product markets. In the other
way around it would be difficult to motivate the joint research lab for products
creation. Additional difficulty for consideration of a standard duopoly case comes
from the distributed character of R&D activities being considered. It is assume
din the model, that there exists a continuum of potential products and all these
products are eventually invented and developed. Since all these products are dif-
ferent from each other in their qualities, they would have different market prices
and thus to obtain duopoly market equilibrium one should account for the con-
tinuum of such markets. Still, the existence of equilibrium for economies with a
continuum of goods is the open question. Thus one has to consider either similar
prices for all products, thus neglecting the full extent of heterogeneity of products
or rather neglect market competition. I use the second alternative to concentrate
on the dynamics of innovations and specialization patterns.
3.2 Formal framework
Assume there are two firms in a given industry. The industry is mature and no
growth of the demand is expected for existing products variety. There are equi-
librium quantities for both firms which depend on the production costs. However,
these costs are fixed for mature products and are not subject to change in the result
of new process innovations. Both firms act as monopolists in their markets which
are separated and cannot be entered by the other firm. In this respect the firms are
regional monopolies. This implies that profit of every firm depends only on its
own production costs but not of that of the other one. For those products which
are already in mature stage, the production, price and profit for each of the firms
are constant. Because of this one may abstract from this part of firms’ activities in
the optimization problem. The objective function of such a reduced optimization
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problem for both firms, is then given by:
J j
def
=
def
= max
u j(•),g j(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
[∫ n(t)
0
(
q j(i, t)− 12g j(i, t)
2
)
di− 1
2
u j(t)2
]
dt.(1)
Where:
• j is the label of the firm, j ∈ [{1},{2}];
• q j(i, t) is the quality of product i at time t for the firm j;
• g j(i, t) are investments into the development of product i at time t being
made by the firm j;
• n(t) is the common for both firms achieved level of the variety of products
at time t;
• u j(t) are investments of the firm j into the expansion of variety of products
at time t.
The basic intuition behind (1) is clear: every firm is maximizing the effect from
its quality innovations for every of the introduced products at every time t. The
range of products, being introduced till time t is given by n(t) and hence the dif-
ference in the effect of achieved quality levels and the investments into them is
evaluated over this range at any point in time. At the same time the investments
into the creation of new products, u j, negatively influence the total value gen-
erated by qualities for the firm while the introduction of new products at some
continuous rate enlarges the space of products, for which subsequent quality im-
provements may be done. Observe that the introduction of the new product per se
does not bring the increase in the value for the firm, since it is assumed that such
a product has zero level of technology. The objective is to maximize the impact
of innovations of both types at the firms value at the infinite time horizon.
This form of a functional assumes that every firm has at each point in time
n(t)+ 1 state variables and strategic variables (controls) and this quantity grows
in time. However the total potential number of variables is fixed by the maximal
potential range of products, N. In terms of value generated by innovations, both
firms are completely symmetric and there is no direct influence of qualities of
developed products of one form on the value of the other. The interaction between
firms is introduced in the dynamics of state variables for both of them.
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Assume the process of development of products is continuous in time and
yields new products (which are new versions of some basic for the industry prod-
uct) proportionally to joint investments of both firms with possibly different effi-
ciencies of investments across firms. The range of these new products is limited
from above. The variety expansion is thus limited to upgrades of some basic
product which defines the industry (e.g. cell phones industry produces different
versions of cell phones but not computers) which justifies the bounded range for
potential products development.
(2) ˙n(t) = α1u j(t)+α− ju− j(t), n(t) ∈ [0, ..,N].
Where α j,α− j are investment efficiencies for variety expansion for both firms
respectively and N is the maximal achievable range of products to be invented.
This means both firms have the same underlying variety expansion process
while freely choosing the level of efforts they would devote to the development
of this variety. Note that this does not exclude the possibility for one or the other
firm to have zero investments while benefiting from the investments being made
by the other through using achieved variety level.
The introduction of each new product is simultaneous for both firms, since
they have joint R&D lab, so they start their investments into these new products
qualities simultaneously. It is natural to require that at the time of introduction,
denoted by ti(0) for each product i, the level of quality of this product is zero. At
each point in time, each of the firms has to choose optimally the level of invest-
ments being made into the development of new products (product innovations)
and into the development of quality of already existing products (quality inno-
vations). These investment streams cannot be negative. At the same time the
technological spillover effect is possible if one of the firms has lower quality than
the other one as it is discussed in Subsec. 3.1. Then for each product i within the
range of introduced products the evolution of qualities of both firms is given by:
˙q j(i, t) = γ j
√
N− ig j(i, t)−β jq j(i, t)+θ ·max{0,(q− j(i, t)−q j(i, t))};
˙q− j(i, t) = γ− j
√
N− ig− j(i, t)−β− jq− j(i, t)+θ ·max{0,(q j(i, t)−q− j(i, t))};
q j(i, t) |i=n(t)= 0;
q j(i,0) = 0,∀i ∈ [0, ..,N];
(3)
Where:
• γ j are efficiencies of investments into the quality of product i for the firm
{1,2}, constant across products and time;
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• β j are technology decay rates in the absence of investments for both agents;
• θ is the speed of technological spillover, equal for both agents.
The term
√
N− i in both processes defines the decreasing efficiency of in-
vestments into the quality growth for both players across products’ range. It is
assumed that the higher is the index i of the product, the harder it is to improve its
production technology due to the increased complexity of the product. The spe-
cific form of this decreasing function is chosen to linearise the resulting dynamical
systems. This is done following the same arguments as in (Bondarev 2012).
Two first equations allow for the possibility of technological spillovers in qual-
ity development between firms. However, due to the max term in them, only one
frim may actually benefit from this spillover and this is the firm which would
have lower quality. At the same time, last two equations here are requirements
for qualities of any product to be zero at the beginning, at t = 0 and at the time
of the introduction of every new product, ti(0), which is defined by the condition
i = n(t). With continuity of state variables and the form of dynamics assumed
this is sufficient to ensure that any product has zero quality all the time before it is
actually introduced (variety expansion process reaches its position in the products
space).
Thus for any product i development of quality starts without any spillovers and
this spillover may appear only eventually due to different speeds of development
of this product. I do not assume any exogenous leader-follower structure here.
Rather conditions for one or another firm to be the leader in the development
of quality of a given product i are obtained as a part of the solution procedure.
The model itself allows for 4 different scenarios for every product development,
depending on the configuration of parameters. These are:
• Firm 1 is the leader in quality development of product i;
• Firm 2 is the leader in quality development of product i;
• Both firms have equal levels of quality development and no technological
spillover occur;
• Initially one of the firms is the leader in quality development, but after some
time the other firm catches up with the leader and becomes the leader itself.
In these paper I analyse only first 3 scenarios, while the last one is more
complicated. The full analysis of this case is the immediate extension of the
results which follow.
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4 Solution
In this section the solution techniques applied to the problem formulated above
are discussed.
4.1 Decomposition of the Problem
Given the basic formulation of dynamical problems of both agents above, it is
clear that the optimal solution has to be found in the form of the equilibrium pair
of strategies in the differential game framework. From the general point of view
the model considered here is the infinite-dimensional one as long as one have
the continuum of quality improving innovations associated with each product for
every player. This may provide some difficulties in formal construction of the
game. However due to the special structure of the dynamic framework being used
it is possible to decompose the problem into ‘quality’ growth problem and variety
expansion problem. This can be done due to the fact that quality improving inno-
vations do not depend on the variety expansion except for the time of emergence
of new products. Then every such a problem should be the finite-dimensional one
and as long as it is of the linear-quadratic form, one may be assured that equilib-
rium exists for each such a game of quality innovations under the same conditions
as in standard linear-quadratic differential game, (Dockner, Jorgensen, Long, and
Sorger 2000). Then the results obtained for this game may be used for solution of
variety expansion problem which is also the differential game but with only one
state, n(t). For this one may rewrite the objective functional of both players (1) in
terms of values generated by the quality innovations and by the variety expansion
games.
To decompose the value function of the overall model, first we make use of
the observation above. Starting from the time of emergence (denoted by t(0)i)
value of each product’s quality for each firm j is independent of variety expansion
process:
Vj(q(i)) = max
g j(i)
∫ ∞
t(0)i
e−r(t−t(0)i)(q j(i, t)− 12g j(i, t)
2)dt;(4)
j ∈ {1,2}, i ∈ [0, ..,N].
where t(0)i is the time of emergence of the product i, which is defined from
the dynamics of the variety expansion process and is similar for both agents due to
the form of dynamic constraints (2), (3). With infinite time horizon the problem of
quality innovations is the time-autonomous one and hence the time of the products
emergence does not influence the value generation process and can be normalized
for all products to zero, (Bondarev 2012). For every product i the maximization of
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the value of quality innovations may be performed separately and independently
of other such problems due to the fact that there is no interaction between quality
innovations across products. However, the overall process of quality innovations
depends on variety expansion, since this last determines the density of quality
innovations. Thus the dependence of these latter from the intensity of introduction
of new products takes place only in the aggregate measure.
Proposition 1 Value functions of quality innovations management game for each
separate product i for both firms, V j(q(i)) are invariant to the investments of both
firms into new products development, u j(t). Only the emergence time of this prod-
uct, t(0)i depends on variety expansion process.
Second part of the overall value generation consists of the intensity of intro-
duction of new products at every time given the expected value of the stream of
profit derived from the reduced costs of production (which comes from quality
innovations) of the newly introduced products. This part may be represented by
the integral over all potential stream of quality innovations for each product over
it’s life-cycle. At the same time this information is already contained in the value
function of the ‘quality’ problem above, so it suffices to integrate over all potential
products at initial time. Last observation to be made is that at the moment of the
emergence of the new product it’s quality is zero, as it is required by (3). These
yield the value function for firm j for variety expansion problem in the following
form:
Vj(n) =
= max
u j
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t))×Vj(q(i)) |i=n(t) −
1
2
u j(t)2
)
dt,(5)
j ∈ {1,2}, i ∈ [0, ..,N].
In the last equation value generated by the quality innovations management game
for each firm is estimated at the zero technology level for the product next to be
invented. Hence one may sequentially solve the quality innovations game for an
arbitrary i, then calculate the associated value function at the zero technology level
and i = n(t) and use this last as an input for the variety expansion game.
Observe that a decomposition method is valid here since there is no competi-
tion on the level of variety expansion. Joint variety expansion process yields the
coincidence of emergence times of all new products for both firms. There is no
dependence of value creation at the level of each separate quality innovation from
the relative speed of variety expansion. Moreover, every firm is able to estimate
the potential accumulated value from the quality of each product in the potential
products’ space, because it may estimate it at zero technology levels not only for
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itself but for the other firm also, since the time of emergence is the same. Then
the value function for the variety expansion does not depend on quality innova-
tions themselves, but only on the potential value generated by the refinement of
the quality for each product as a whole. In the effect this value function although
different for both firms (as their quality innovations’ value functions are different)
is invariant to the future quality innovations associated with every new product i.
Proposition 2 Value function of the variety expansion game for both players,
Vj(n) is invariant to the investments being made into the qualities of all the prod-
ucts except the boundary one, g j(i) |i=n(t). Moreover, it depends only on the to-
tal value generated by the quality of this product at the time of its emergence,
Vj(q(i)) |i=n(t).
In an effect one may observe that there is an influence of quality innovations on
the intensity of variety expansion but the inverse effect is almost absent. However,
due to cooperation at the level of variety expansion, technological spillovers are
possible in quality innovations. One may think of quality and variety expansion
innovations as of process and product innovations respectively. Then it is straight-
forward to relate this form of the interdependence of different types innovations to
the empirical literature on the subject, (Faria and Lima 2009) (Kraft 1990). Also
it follows the general setup of (Albernathy and Utterback 1978).
4.2 Quality Innovations
Consider first the problem of quality innovations management for each product i
for both firms 1,2. The value function for each such an innovation is given by Eq.
(4) for every firm. At the same time the evolution of qualities is given by dynamic
constraints(3) for every product i.
Such two problems constitute the differential game with two states, being lev-
els of qualities achieved by both firms for product i, and two controls which are
investment strategies of the firms for every i. Note that the formulation of the
game is of the same form across all products’ qualities and they are independent
of each other. Hence solution of this game is valid for any i. The associated pair of
HJB equations is dependent on both states for each firm as well as on investments
of both firms.
Proposition 3 For each product i∈ [0, ..,N] the evolution of qualities of both firms
is governed by the 2-state differential game, which has the same form for all prod-
ucts. This game is defined by the pair of objective functions (4) and dynamics of
qualities (3) and includes undirected technological spillover effect. The pair of
HJB equations governs all modes of the game. Realization of one or the other
mode depends on the direction of technological spillover and its presence.
11
The technological spillover effect is modelled through the term max{0,(q j(i, t)−
q− j(i, t))} in the dynamics of both qualities. This is undirected, since any firm
may benefit from this spillover, depending on which one will take the lead in de-
velopment of the product. As it has been discussed above, there are 4 possible
situations, with symmetric outcome being the one with no spillover.
I first consider the non-symmetric case with different efficiencies of quality
investments. The symmetric case result is obtained along the same lines, but is
more difficult to prove, since value functions of both firms are not differentiable in
the symmetric situation. Thus I state the result for symmetric case with underlying
intuition later on without formal proof. The rigorous treatment of the symmetric
case may be found in the PhD thesis of the author.
Constant leadership in qualities
For technological spillover to be present it is necessary for firms to have different
investment efficiencies γ1,2, since they start their investments simultaneously and
with zero quality level for any new product. However, if one of the firms has
higher efficiency of investments, it will acquire higher quality level almost from
the start of the project. It is possible, however, for the other firm to catch up with
the leading one later on, if the backward firm has lower decay rates of technology,
β j. I limit myself to the situation with constant leadership, when such a catch up
is not possible.
As long as one of the firms has the leadership in the quality innovations, that
is, q j(i, t) > q− j(i, t), its quality dynamics does not depend on the technological
spillover, while the other’s does. Then subsequent pair of HJB equations may be
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written as:
rVj(i) =
max
g j(•)
{
q j(i, t)− 12g j(i, t)
2+
∂Vj(i)
∂q j(i, t)
(
γ j
√
(N− i)g j(i, t)−β jq j(i, t)
)
+
∂Vj(i)
∂q− j(i, t)
(
γ− j
√
(N− i)g− j(i, t)−β− jq− j(i, t)−θ ×
(
q j(i, t)−q− j(i, t)
))}
;
rV− j(i) =
max
g− j(•)
{
q− j(i, t)− 12g− j(i, t)
2+
∂V− j(i)
∂q j(i, t)
(
γ j
√
(N− i)g j(i, t)−β jq j(i, t)
)
+
∂V− j(i)
∂q− j(i, t)
(
γ− j
√
(N− i)g− j(i, t)−β− jq− j(i, t)+θ ×
(
q j(i, t)−q− j(i, t)
))}
.
(6)
Observe that in this formulation only the firm − j, which is called the ‘follower’
is benefiting from the technological spillover resulting from superior production
technology of the other firm j. This can be seen from the form of the dynamic
constraint on the dynamics of technologies which is different between firms for
constant leadership case and includes the spillover effect only for the follower.
Proposition 4 The regime with constant technological leadership of one firm is
an equilibrium of the quality game if one of the firms has advantage in the effi-
ciency of quality investments and qualities decay at the same rate for both firms:
γ j > γ− j;
β j = β− j = β .(7)
Where j could be any of the two firms. I denote the one with the leading efficiency
γ j as the leader, L and the other as the follower, F .
Equilibrium strategies are derived through the HJB equations (6) under the
assumption of linear in states value functions of both firms. Formal derivation may
be found in the Appendix. Linear value functions yield open-loop equilibrium.
The case of closed-loop may also be considered, but the formal treatment is more
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complicated. It is sufficient to note here, that for the case of constant leadership
open-loop equilibrium coincides with the closed-loop one.
I use the derived (piecewise-constant) optimal strategies to define evolution of
qualities for product i for both firms as a pair of differential equations resulting
from (3). These equations may be explicitly solved. Formal derivations and ex-
plicit evolution of qualities are in the Appendix. The following proposition sum-
marizes main information on the solution of quality game in constant leadership
mode.
Proposition 5 (Solution of quality game with constant leadership) If (7) is ful-
filled, optimal strategies of the leader and the follower are given by:
gLj (i) =
 γ j
√
(N−i)
r+β , t : i≥ n(t);
0, t : i < n(t).
gF− j(i) =
 γ− j
√
(N−i)
r+β+θ , t : i≥ n(t);
0, t : i < n(t).
(8)
They are constant in time after the introduction of the product i, but are different
across products. For every product i the leader invests more, then the follower,
gLj (i)≥ gF− j(i). For every next product investments are lower for both firms,
gLj (i)< g
L
j (i+ ε),g
F
− j(i)< g
F
− j(i+ ε);
∀(N− i)> ε > 0.(9)
Associated quality level of the leader and the follower are defined by the dynamic
system after the time of emergence: ˙qLj (i, t) =
γ2j
β+r (N− i)−βq j(i, t), t : i≥ n(t);
˙qF− j(i, t) =
γ2− j
β+θ+r (N− i)+θq j(i, t)− (β +θ)q− j(i, t), t : i≥ n(t).
(10)
Quality of the leader is higher then that of the follower after the time of emergence,
qLj (i, t)> q
F− j(i, t) and for both firms quality for every next product is lower at any
time after the product’s emergence:
qLj (i, t)< q
L
j (i+ ε, t),q
F
− j(i, t)< q
F
− j(i+ ε, t);
∀(N− i)> ε > 0,∀t > ti(0).(11)
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One may now compute values, which are generated by the quality devel-
opment of product i for both firms. The proof, that the leader-follower non-
symmetric equilibrium is indeed the stable one amounts to the comparison of the
value, which the leader may acquire through imitation activities with the value the
leading firm acquires from its equilibrium strategy. This direct comparison shows,
that under the strategy of being the leader the technologically superior firm still
acquires maximum possible value although not benefiting from the spillover ef-
fect. Observe that this result would not necessarily hold under proper duopoly
situation, since this will influence prices of products. Thus it is essential to re-
strict attention to regional monopolies in the sense of market competition. Formal
comparison of value functions may be found in the Appendix.
Proposition 6 (Uniqueness and stability of constant leadership mode) As long
as (7) holds, there is only one equilibrium in the quality game for each i and it is
given by (8).
In this case the value of quality innovations game is always higher for the firm
which leads in investment efficiencies when it invests as a leader in this game,
while the opposite holds for the firm which has lower efficiency γ− j:
V Lj (i)>V
F
j (i);(12)
V L− j(i)<V
F
− j(i).(13)
and the equilibrium with constant technological spillover to the benefit of techno-
logically backward firm is stable.
We need values generated by the quality game estimated at the zero quality
level and at the initial time. These are estimated future profits from quality de-
velopment which drive the variety expansion activity. These values are estimated
for the boundary product, which will appear next at every moment of time. De-
note these values as V Lj (0) and V
F− j(0) for firm j being the technological leader
and firm − j, being technologically backwards respectively. Derivation in the Ap-
pendix shows that these values are functions of variety expansion process, see
Eqs. (B.3), (B.4).
Symmetric case
The symmetric case is not easy to prove, since value functions of both firms are not
differentiable along the line of equal qualities for any product, q j(i, t) = q− j(i, t).
Thus standard HJB techniques do not apply for this case. However it may be
formally proved, that the symmetric outcome occurs only if efficiencies of invest-
ments into qualities for both firms are equal. In this case there are two symmetric
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outcomes: with positive imitation speed θ and with zero imitation speed. Here I
just state this result without proof. The formal treatment of this symmetric case
may be found in the PhD thesis of the author.
Proposition 7 (Solution of quality game in symmetric case) The symmetric out-
come of quality game for each i realises when the following is fulfilled:
(14) γ j = γ− j = γ,β j = β− j = β .
In this case both firms make similar investments into qualities and there quali-
ties are equal during all the development of any product i. Equilibrium levels of
investments are the same as for the technologically backward firm:
gSY Mj (i, t) = g
SY M
− j (i, t) =
γ
√
N− i
r+θ +β
;(15)
With positive speed of potential spillover, θ > 0, qualities of both firms are as low
as that of the technologically backward firm in constant technological leadership
regime:
(16) qSY Mj (i, t) = q
SY M
− j (i, t) = q
θ (i, t) = qF(i, t), θ > 0;
With zero imitation speed both qualities are developed to the level of technologi-
cally superior firm in constant leadership setting:
(17) qSY Mj (i, t) = q
SY M
− j (i, t) = q
0(i, t) = qL(i, t), θ = 0.
Thus the symmetric case solution is described as a particular case of non-
symmetric solution and not the other way around. It has to be noted, that under
the zero technological spillover speed the solution for each firm is fully the same
as that for the single monopoly in (Bondarev 2012).
4.3 Variety Expansion Game
Variety expansion problem is the differential game with one state and two controls.
Both firms invest simultaneously in the variety expansion and benefit from the
resulting variety on common base thus sharing all the information on this level
of innovations. The dynamic problem for both firms is to maximize the potential
output of innovations given the costs of investments. Note that the potential profit
in this part of the model consists only from the future accumulated profit from
development of qualities of newly invented products. Since we limit ourselves
to the case of open-loop strategies in the quality innovations game the variety
expansion problem is also solved in this class of strategies. The other strategies,
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of piecewise-constant and of closed-loop type are considered as an immediate
extension.
For the characterization of the open-loop solution for the variety expansion
game the maximum principle method is convenient. One may rewrite the problem
of variety expansion, using the Eq. (5) for firm j as following:
J j(n) =max
u j(•)
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t))Vj(0)− 12u j(t)
2
)
dt;
s.t.
˙n(t) = α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t);
u j(t),u− j(t)≥ 0,∀t ≥ 0.(18)
And the same type of a problem for firm − j since the variety expansion game
is completely symmetric and objectives differ only in the value generated by de-
velopment of qualities, Vj,− j(0), given by Eqs. (B.3), (B.4).
Both value functions from quality innovations game are linear in n(t). Denote
the constant part by C j,C− j:
Vj(0) =C j · (N−n(t));
V− j(0) =C− j · (N−n(t)).(19)
where C j,C− j ≥ 0 are given by constant parts of (B.3) and (B.4).
The constant part may vary in size depending on the leadership in the quality
innovations game, but the variety expansion is analysed parametrically and then
the dynamics corresponding to different regimes of the quality innovations game
are compared. This may be done since these constant parts of value functions
above do not depend on the state variable and controls nor time. This consti-
tutes the one-state differential game with common state constraint which may be
solved using standard techniques. First I construct Hamiltonians of the given prob-
lem and derive first-order conditions on controls. Controls appear to be functions
of shadow costs of investments. Then the resulting triple of differential equa-
tions (for common variety expansion and separate shadow costs for both firms) is
solved and this solution is sued to define explicit form of optimal controls of both
firms in variety expansion game. Formal details may be found in the Appendix.
The resulting optimal investments of both firms are decreasing functions of time,
since the exponential term has negative power. Thus, the variety expansion inno-
vations increase the variety of products at a decreasing speed up to the maximal
variety N. Investments are completely symmetric except for the terms α j,− jC j,− j,
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which depend on investment efficiencies and value generated by the quality inno-
vations for the next product to be invented for both firms. Hence relative scale
of investments into the variety expansion depends on the outcome of the quality
innovations game. The overall evolution of variety expansion is an increasing
concave function.
Main features of the resulting solution are summarized in the Proposition be-
low.
Proposition 8 (Solution of variety expansion game) Investments of both firms
into the variety expansion are greater than zero and depend on the value gen-
erated by expected quality innovations into the next product. They are decreasing
function of time:
u j(t)∗ =
α jC j(r+A)
2α2j C j +2α2− jC− j + r+A
· (N−n0)e 12 (r−A)t ;
u− j(t)∗ =
α− jC− j(r+A)
2α2j C j +2α2− jC− j + r+A
· (N−n0)e 12 (r−A)t .(20)
With common variety expansion process the available for both firms products va-
riety n(t) is increasing over time with decreasing speed and reaches the maximal
available level N in infinite time:
(21) n(t)∗ = N− (N−n0)e 12 (r−A)t .
This solution has the same form independent of which regime realises in quality
innovations game.
with
(22) A =
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j),
being the function of values generated by quality development for both firms.
Observe, that the solution of the variety expansion game has the same form
independent of what regime realises in quality game (constant leadership, catch-
up or symmetric case), since variety expansion investments depend on constant
parts of value functions of both firms in quality game, C j,C− j. These of course,
will be different for different regimes, but they will be still constant and relative
intensity of investments of both firm into variety expansion will be affected, but
not the analytic form derived here.
It is of interest to compare the dynamics of variety expansion under cooper-
ative investments of both firms and in the case when they invest separately. If
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firms would choose not to cooperate in variety expansion, they will have indepen-
dent ranges of products being defined by their investment efficiencies. These two
processes may be obtained by solving the dynamic problem for variety expansion
with for every firm with other firm’s investments being set to zero. This solution
coincides with the one for multiproduct monopoly in (Bondarev 2012). The direct
comparison of variety expansion paths shows, that the cooperation in the case of
constant leadership is better for both firms.
Proposition 9 (Stability of cooperative equilibrium in variety expansion game)
Denote:
• nLF(t) cooperative variety expansion under constant leadership of one of
the firms in quality innovations game;
• nMONOj (t),nMONO− j (t) variety expansion being obtained under independent
investments;
• V LFj (n),V MONOj (n) value of variety expansion for firm j under cooperative
constant leadership mode and independent investments.
As long as (7) hold, for any difference in variety expansion investment efficien-
cies α j,α− j, the cooperative variety expansion rate is higher than the one being
obtained under independent investments for both leading and the following firm.
Value of variety expansion game under cooperation is also higher than for inde-
pendent investments for both firms as a result:
∀0≤ t < ∞ :
nLF(t)> nMONOj (t),n
LF(t)> nMONO− j (t);
V LFj (n)>V
MONO
j (n),V
LF
− j (n)>V
MONO
− j (n).(23)
Thus cooperative variety expansion is a stable equilibrium of variety expansion
game with non-zero investments of both firms, defined by open-loop strategies.
Now with both parts of the problem being solved we may analyse the dynam-
ics of the model in more details.
5 Results
5.1 Dynamics of quality innovations
The quality innovations game exhibits a variety of features. First, depending on
relations between efficiency and decay parameters of both firms it is possible to
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obtain positive imitation (technological spillover) effect and symmetric outcome
of the game.
The symmetric outcome appears to have two case, depending on the presence
of possibility of technological spillover. It turns out, that if there is a potential for
imitation, both firms will try to imitate each other with no success. In this case the
presence of imitation possibility has a negative impact on the development of all
the products for both firms, since their qualities will be low. At the same time, if
there is no possibility for imitation (or firms are unaware of it), the game reduces
to two independent optimization problems for both firms and the outcome is the
same as if these firms would not interact at all. In this case both firms will have
higher qualities than in the presence of imitation effect.
If there are differences between firms in terms of investment efficiencies, but
not in decay rates, one of the firms becomes the leader in development of quality of
every product i since the introduction of this product (being defined from variety
expansion game). In this case the technological leader will have higher quality for
every product all the time after appearance of this product, which is the same as
if this leading firm would develop the quality without interaction with the other
firm. Thus the value of quality innovations for the leading firm is the same as for
the monopolist and the symmetric game with no imitation.
At the same time the technologically backward firm will always have lower
quality level, but will also invest less than the leader to obtain benefits from the
technological spillover. In this way the value, being generated for the follower by
quality innovations would be greater, then for the leading firm, since less invest-
ments are being made. Direct comparison of resulting value functions demon-
strates, that both firms have no incentives to change their positions even if they
would have such a possibility. Observe, that positions of the leader and the fol-
lower are not predefined as well as optimal investment paths. It is possible for
the leader to reduce investments to lower its quality to benefit from technological
spillover. However, as the leading firm has higher efficiency of investments the
relative gain from imitation and reduction of investments is not enough to com-
pensate the reduction in quality. It is more profitable for the leading firm to remain
the leader, although it misses positive potential gain from this spillover. The more
is the difference in investment efficiencies γ between firms, the more is the gap
between qualities of the leader and the follower and the more benefits the follower
obtains. At the same time this means higher efficiency for the leader and thus this
firm will still benefit more from direct investments than from potential imitation.
Qualities of both firm for each product i gradually increase (since both invests
positive amounts) to the maximum. This maximum is reached at infinite time
and is the steady sate level of quality for every firm. Observe, that there are two
different possible steady state levels of quality for every firm, one associated with
the strategy of the follower and the other with the strategy of the leader. The
20
stability result means, that the firm which is the leader, has higher steady state
value of quality innovations while remaining the leader and the following firm has
higher steady state value remaining the follower. This result may change if one
allows for different decay rates of qualities. In this case the steady state is not
unique and changes in leadership may occur. However, such situation is much
more complicated and left over for extension of the current paper. The following
proposition summarizes information on the relations of values and quality levels
in steady states of the quality game.
Proposition 10 (Steady states of quality game) There is a unique steady-state
level of quality, ¯q j(i), as long as either (7) or (14) hold. This is the maximal level
of quality for each product i. Quality for every firm monotonically grows up to
this level being reached in infinite time.
For each product i this level is higher for every firm in the leadership regime
than while being the follower
(24) ¯qL(i)> ¯qF(i),∀ j;
However, the firm which is the follower obtains higher value by reaching lower
quality level and the opposite for the leader:
V F( ¯qFF(i))>V
F( ¯qLF(i));
V L( ¯qL(i))>V L( ¯qF(i))(25)
In symmetric case steady state levels of quality and values are similar for both
firms,
(26) ¯qSY Mj (i) =
¯qSY M− j (i) = ¯qSY M(i),V (
¯qSY Mj (i)) =V (
¯qSY M− j (i)) =V ( ¯qSY M(i)).
Steady state level of quality are lower with possibility of imitation than in the
absence of it, as well as values of the game:
(27) ¯q0(i)> ¯qθ (i),V ( ¯q0(i))>V ( ¯qθ (i)).
For illustration of the difference in investment policies caused by leader-follower
patterns I take the following set of parameters which corresponds to leadership of
firm j in quality innovations. Efficiency of investments into variety expansion is
assumed to be equal for both firms:
SET JL := [γ j = 0.7,γ− j = 0.4,β = 0.2];
(28)
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Figure 1: Difference in quality levels for different products and between firms
with
[n0 = 1,α j = α− j = 0.5,r = 0.01,θ = 0.15,N = 1000]
for both variants.
The evolution of qualities governed by the system (10) is displayed at the
Figure 1. It might be seen that leader’s ‘quality’ is always higher then that of
the following firm while both firms’ technology levels are lower for every next
invented product then for the preceding one. This last comes from the assumption
of decreasing returns on investments into every next product quality, which is
reflected in the
√
N− i term entering the evolution equations. It can also be seen
that quality innovations for each product eventually reach the steady-state level
and do not increase further on. This steady state levels are different for the leader
and the follower and also differ across products.
5.2 Dynamics of variety expansion
Consider now the shape of the variety expansion. Since it is already demonstrated,
that cooperative variety expansion will lead to higher value for both firms under
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constant leadership mode, here I compare the variety expansion speed under con-
stant leadership in quality growth and symmetric quality investments. It turns
out, that the benefit the follower expects to obtain from technological spillover in
the quality development of the next to be introduced product stimulates this firm
to invest more into variety expansion. As a result, under positive technological
spillover variety expansion speed is higher, than in the absence of such. The next
proposition defines the ordering of variety expansion (and associated values of the
game) between different regimes.
Proposition 11 (Variety expansion for cooperative firms and monopoly) Denote:
• nMONO(t) variety expansion of a single monopolist with γM = γ j+γ− j2 ;
• nSY M0 (t) variety expansion of cooperative firms with symmetric quality in-
vestments without possibility of imitation;
• nMONO0 (t) variety expansion of both firms with symmetric quality invest-
ments without possibility of imitation, when both firms invest independently;
• nSY Mθ (t) variety expansion of cooperative firms with symmetric quality in-
vestments with possibility of imitation;
• nMONOθ (t) variety expansion of both firms with symmetric quality invest-
ments with possibility of imitation, when both firms invest independently.
As long as (7) holds, the following ordering of variety expansion processes holds
for t < ∞:
(29) nLF(t)> nSY M0 (t)> n
SY M
θ (t)> n
MONO(t) = nMONO0 (t)> n
MONO
θ (t).
Proof is done by direct verification of each relationship and is straightforward.
At the Figure 2 one may find the variety expansion of the differential game
with different modes being considered for both firms and that of the single firm in
the market. In this figure the same set SET JL of parameters is adopted for illus-
tration purposes, while the single monopolist’s efficiency of quality innovations
investments is set in between of the two firms at the level γM =
γ j+γ− j
2 and all other
parameters kept similar.
One may see that under the cooperative investments the variety expansion
speed is the highest possible for constant leadership case and all other cases follow
the ordering of Proposition 11.
This ordering gives an insight into the interdependence of both part of the
model. The variety expansion rate is maximal under positive technological spillover
of the quality game, since the cooperative investments are driven by the expected
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Figure 2: Product innovations for cooperative investments and a single firm
value of the development of the next product for every firm. The sum of these
values is maximal if one of the firms use the benefits of technological spillover.
In symmetric case cooperative investments are slower, since no one benefits from
this spillover effect. Variety expansion is faster if no imitation is possible in sym-
metric situation, since value of quality game in this case is higher than under
symmetric outcome with positive potential spillover. In this last case the possi-
bility of imitation has a negative impact on the overall variety expansion, but this
may take place only if no actual imitation occurs.
All cooperative cases yield higher variety expansion rates than monopolistic
one, since both firms contribute non-zero amounts to this variety expansion pro-
cess. The only case, when variety expansion process may be slower, than that of
the monopolist, is the case when two conditions are fulfilled: there is possibility
for imitation, but firms are symmetric and they choose to invest independently of
each other.
Combination of dynamics of both parts of the model, demonstrated at Fig-
ures 2 and 1 provides the reconstruction of the full dynamics of the model under
constant leadership in qualities. This is displayed at Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Variety expansion and quality innovations
From this Figure one may observe the role of variety expansion process. The
higher is the speed of introduction of new products, the more dense is the aggre-
gate process of quality innovations. Thus, variety expansion is the generator of
quality innovations. One may observe the underlying process of generation of
products variety, n(t), together with associated processes of technology improve-
ments for both firms and for different products. The domination in technology
levels is preserved along all the range of products to be invented.
All these points to the fact, that positive costless technological spillover or
imitation is not harmful for any of the firms. Instead, it allows for specialization
of investment activities in the case firms are not symmetric. This specialization
yields both higher value of quality improving and variety-expanding innovations.
This effect is treated in more details further on.
5.3 Specialization of innovations
Now consider the overall strategic profile and value generated for both firms under
the positive technological spillover regime of the model. Here only this regime is
considered, since the specialization effect in both directions of quality and vari-
eties may be observed only for this regime. It turns out, that one of the firms in-
vests more into the development of quality innovations while the other one invests
more into the creation of new products. Thus the specialization of innovative ac-
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tivities is observed. It may be shown, that this effect is robust to parameters value
changes as well as to the change in leadership.
To observe this specialization effect, consider first the set of optimal strategies
for the quality innovations game for both firms in the case of constant leader, given
by Eq. (8). It is straightforward that the leaders’ investments are higher than those
of the follower for each i, if (7) hold. At the same time leader’s value of the quality
innovations game is always lower than that of the follower since its investments
do not depend on the achieved technology level and are higher than those of the
follower. At zero technology level leader’s value is lower than that of the follower
also. This constitutes the specialization of innovative activities of both firms in
the area of quality innovations.
Next consider variety expansion innovations iven by Eq. (20). As it has been
noted, the value of the quality innovations game estimated at zero technology level
is higher for the follower. Hence,the investments into the variety expansion of the
follower are higher than those of the leader, as (C.6) are completely symmetric
except for the value functions of the quality innovations game. It follows, that
the higher is the difference in values generated for both firms by the quality inno-
vations game, the higher is the difference in variety expansion investments. The
firm which is the leader in quality innovations invests less then the follower all
the time. The decrease in intensity of product innovations over time is explained
through the increasing complexity of the development of process innovations for
every next product within the products’ range. Since the only source of new value
is the value generated by the development of the production technologies for new
products through quality innovations, it becomes less attractive to introduce new
products in comparison to the development of already existing ones as the process
of variety expansion approaches its limit N.
These two effect constitutes the specialization effect, which is summarized in
the last proposition of this paper.
Proposition 12 (Specialization of innovations) As long as (7) is fulfilled, and
cooperation at variety expansion level takes place, with firm j being the leader
and− j being the follower for simplicity, the following specialization of investment
activities is observed:
∀i ∈ N,∀t > ti(0) : gLj (i)> gF− j(i)≥ 0;
∀t < ∞ : uF− j(t)> uLj (t)≥ 0;(30)
so that the firm which benefits from technological spillover invests more into the
variety expansion than the other one. This specialization is efficient in the sense,
that no other strategic profile may yield higher overall values of innovating ac-
tivities for both firms and higher rates of introduction of new products and their
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improvements. Thus, the positive costless technological spillover is beneficial for
technology and value of innovations.
6 Discussion
In this section I discuss the robustness of results being obtained.
First consider the quality innovations part of the model. Every next product
has lower maximal quality (production technology) level than preceding ones.
This is the direct consequence of the shape of the function γ j(i) = γ j
√
N− i which
defines, how investment efficiency changes from product to product. Since this
function is defined to be decreasing, the resulting maximal quality is decreasing
also from product to product. However, the fact, that if one of the firms is the
leader in quality innovations for one of the products it is also the leader for all
other products is robust to the choice of investment efficiency function, as long as
this last is a monotonic function of i. If it is not monotonic, for some products
one of the firms will be technological leader, and for other products - the other
firm. This means that results of Proposition 5 concerning ordering of qualities
across products are specific for this specific choice of γ(i) function. However, for
each product i the same form of investment strategies and evolution of qualities
hold, once the leadership of one of the firms is defined. Investments for both firms
are constant and higher for the leader than for the follower. For every product
i stability result of the solution given by Proposition 6 holds irrespective of the
choice of investment efficiency function γ(i).
Results of the variety expansion part also depend on the choice of this effi-
ciency function. The decreasing speed of variety expansion is the direct conse-
quence of decreasing efficiency of investments across products. Every next prod-
uct has lower expected value of innovations and its introduction is thus less prof-
itable. This may change with increasing across products efficiency of investments.
The fact, that both firms invest non-zero amounts into variety expansion is not ro-
bust. If one would consider closed-loop strategies, the firm, which is the leader
in quality innovations will not invest into variety expansion at all, since it will an-
ticipate positive investments of the technological follower. However, in this paper
only open loop strategies are analysed. Under open loop both firms invest accord-
ing to the desired level of variety expansion and they do not take into account the
possible reaction of the other firm. Still the ordering of investments in Proposition
12 will continue to hold for closed loop case also with leader’s investments being
zero.
The suggested model demonstrates, that costless imitation effect may be of
benefit not only for the imitator, but for the firm, which is imitated also, if these
firms are operating on separated markets (no market competition). Whether or
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no this would hold for the proper duopoly with product market competition, is
an open question, since innovations would influence price and quantity dynamics.
These may influence innovations incentives in turn. Thus the overall dynamics of
the model would be more complicated and it is not clear, whether the explicit so-
lution may be achieved with such modification. At the same time treating firms as
local monopolies makes the costless imitation effect sustainable, since the leader
does not loose any value because of being imitated. This allows for sustainable
specialization of investments between firms, described by Proposition 12.
Now one may ask, how robust is this main result of the paper. The special-
ization effect takes plays as long as there is positive technological spillover to the
benefit of one of the firms. This spillover creates differences in the investment
patterns of the leader and the follower. For this to happen it is enough for firms
to have different efficiencies of investments into quality improvements, γ j 6= γ− j.
Equal decay rates, being assumed by (7) are really not necessary. These identi-
cal decay rates are introduced to simplify the notation only. If decay rates would
be different, there appears additional regime of the game, namely with changing
leadership. It may occur, when one of the firms has higher efficiency of qual-
ity investments and also higher decay rates. Then initially this firm will take the
leading position in technology development, but later on its growth would slow
down due to high decay rates. The other firm would be the follower for some time
and then will catch up with the technological leader due to positive technological
spillover and lower decay rates. It may be demonstrated, that specialization effect
holds in this situation also, with the firm which become the follower in the long
run investing more into the variety expansion and less into quality development
for all the products.
The case of possible catching up in technologies may also change the relative
values of innovations processes for both firms. The broader solution of the model
with different decay rates is consider to be an immediate extension of the current
work. Another interesting extension would be to consider proper duopoly and
check, whether the specialization effect would continue to hold if market compe-
tition is allowed to influence innovations.
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Appendices
A Derivation of optimal strategies and solutions for
the quality game with constant leadership
Using HJB equation from (6) first order conditions for controls yield the following
form of them:
g j(i, t)∗ = γ j
√
(N− i) · ∂Vj(i)
∂q j(i, t)
;
g− j(i, t)∗ = γ− j
√
(N− i) · ∂V− j(i)
∂q− j(i, t)
.(A.1)
Hence the form of the optimal control is defined by the form of the underlying
value function for both firms separately. Assume the following form of value
functions for both firms:
Vj(i) = A jq j(i, t)+B jq− j(i, t)+C j.(A.2)
Consider first the HJB equation for the leading firm. This firm does not bene-
fit from the imitation effect but its problem is influenced by the imitation effect
present for the other firm. The position of the leader is characterized by the con-
dition:
(A.3) ∀i, t : q j(i, t)> q− j(i, t),
Of course, as long as one of the firms is the leader in quality innovations, the other
is the follower. Inserting (A.2) into the pair of HJB equations (6) and using (7)
one obtains the following set of coefficients for the leaders’ value function:
A j = 1β+r ;
B j = 0;
C j = 12
γ2j
(β+r)2r (N− i).
(A.4)
Hence coefficients for the leader’s value function do not depend on the optimal in-
vestments of the follower. This set of coefficients corresponds to the linear value
function of the leader with the absence of cross-effects and hence the optimal
strategy is constant as long as (A.3) holds. Together with first-order conditions on
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controls the derived value function of the leader constitutes optimal (piecewise-
constant) control for the leader:
g j(i, t) =
 γ j
√
(N−i)
r+β , t : i≥ n(t);
0, t : i < n(t).
(A.5)
Now consider the problem of the follower. Inserting (A.2) into the second
equation in (6) results in a system of equations for coefficients of the followers’
value function:
A− j = 1θ+β+r ;
B− j = θ(β+r)(β+θ+r) ;
C− j = 12
(r2γ2− j+β 2γ2− j+2γ2j θ2+2θβγ2j +(2θγ2j +2βγ2− j)r)
r(β+r)2(r+β+θ)2 (N− i).
(A.6)
Here value function of the follower depends on the level of technology achieved
by quality innovations of the leader. Since this last is known already, one has the
explicit formulation of the value function for the follower. One may derive the
optimal investments of the follower according to first order conditions (A.1):
g− j(i, t) =
 γ− j
√
(N−i)
r+β+θ , t : i≥ n(t);
0, t : i < n(t).
(A.7)
Optimal strategies (A.5) and (A.7) yield the ODE system starting from time ti(0)
of the introduction of product i: ˙qLj (i, t) =
γ2j
β+r (N− i)−βq j(i, t), t : i≥ n(t);
˙qF− j(i, t) =
γ2− j
β+θ+r (N− i)+θq j(i, t)− (β +θ)q− j(i, t), t : i≥ n(t).
(A.8)
yielding qualities fro both firms as functions of the position of the product, i and
time t:
qLj (i, t) =
γ2j (N− i)
β (r+β )
· (1− e−β t);
qF− j(i, t) =
(
1+(N− i) · (E1(e
(β+θ)t +1)
β +θ
− E2(e
θ t +1)
θ
)
× e−(β+θ)t .(A.9)
30
where E1,E2 = f (γ j,− j,β ,θ) are some functions of parameters only. Eqs. (A.5),
(A.7), (A.8), (A.9) constitute Proposition 5.
B Value functions for the quality game
Values generated by the quality innovations with constant leadership are computed
by inserting (A.4), (A.6) into (A.2) and then using the solution (A.9):
V Lj (i) =
q j(i, t)
r+β
+
1
2
γ2j
r(r+β )2
(N− i);
V F− j(i) = 2
(
q− j(i, t)
θ + r+β
+
θ
r+β
× q j(i, t)
θ + r+β
)
+
+
(
θγ2j
r(r+β )(r+θ +β )
1
r+β
+
1
2
γ2− j
r(r+θ +β )
)
(N− i).(B.1)
From this it might be seen that it is not profitable for the firm which is the leader
in process innovations to choose the investments rate lower than optimal. In the
constant leadership case it suffices to compare value functions at the start of in-
vestments, with zero quality level. The value functions for the firm j at this point
are given by:
V Lj (i)|q(i)=0 =
1
2
γ2j
r(r+β )2
(N− i);
V Fj (i)|q(i)=0 =
(
θγ2− j
r(r+β )(r+θ +β )
1
r+β
+
1
2
γ2j
r(r+θ +β )
)
(N− i).(B.2)
for being the leader and being the follower respectively. Direct comparison of
these values while (7) holds shows that the first value is always higher than the
second one. The opposite holds for the following firm. This proves Proposition 6.
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The values being generated for both firms by the boundary product in constant
leadership mode, estimated at the initial time are:
V Lj (0) |(i=n(t))=
1
2
γ j
(r+β )2r
(N−n(t));(B.3)
V F− j(0) |(i=n(t))=
(
θγ2j
r(r+β )(r+θ +β )
1
r+β
+
1
2
γ2− j
r(r+θ +β )
)
(N− i).(B.4)
These values are used for the solution of the variety expansion problem in the way
discussed previously.
C Optimal strategies and solution for the problem
of variety expansion
Hamiltonian functions for both firms are obtained using eqs. (18). They are sym-
metric for both players:
H j(n,λ j,u j,u− j) =
=
(
(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t))C j(N−n(t))− 12u j(t)
2
)
+λ j(t)(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t));
(C.1)
H− j(n,λ j,u j,u− j) =
=
(
(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t))C− j(N−n(t))− 12u− j(t)
2
)
+λ− j(t)(α ju j(t)+α− ju− j(t)).
(C.2)
The first-order conditions on the investments into the variety expansion for both
firms define investments as functions of co-state variables:
∂H j
∂u j
= 0 : u j(t)∗ = α jλ j(t)+C j(N−n(t));
∂H− j
∂u− j
= 0 : u− j(t)∗ = α− jλ− j(t)+C− j(N−n(t)).(C.3)
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Substituting these into Hamiltonian functions and writing down co-state equations
yield the canonical system for the variety expansion game:
λ˙ j = rλ j− ∂H j∂n(t) =
= (r+α2j C j)λ j(t)+α
2
− jC jλ− j(t)+(α
2
j (C j)
2+α2− jC jC− j)(N−n(t));
˙λ− j = rλ− j− ∂H− j∂n(t) =
= (r+α2− jC− j)λ− j(t)+α
2
j C− jλ j(t)+(α
2
− j(C− j)
2+α2j C jC− j)(N−n(t));
˙n(t) = α2j λ j(t)+α
2
− jλ− j(t)+(α
2
j (C j)
2+α2− j(C− j)
2)(N−n(t));
n(0) = n0;
lim
t→∞e
−rtλ j(t) = 0;
lim
t→∞e
−rtλ− j(t) = 0.
(C.4)
Inserting optimal controls into the dynamic constraint for variety expansion
together with (C.4) constitutes the system of 3 linear ODEs with one initial con-
dition and two boundary conditions (transversal ones) which is then solved. The
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solution is:
n(t)∗ = N− (N−n0)e
1
2 (r−
√
r(r+4α2j C j+4α
2− jC− j))t ;
λ j(t)∗ =−
C j(α2j C j +α2− jC j)
2α2j C j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
·
·2(N−n0)e
1
2 (r−
√
r(r+4α2j C j+4α
2− jC− j))t ;
λ− j(t)∗ =−
C− j(α2j C j +α2− jC j)
2α2j C j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
·
·2(N−n0)e
1
2 (r−
√
r(r+4α2j C j+4α
2− jC− j))t .(C.5)
Then I use (C.5) to define explicitly investments of both firms as functions of time
from (C.3):
u j(t)∗ =
α jC j(r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j))
2α2j C j +2α2− jC− j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
·
·(N−n0)e
1
2 (r−
√
r(r+4α2j C j+4α
2− jC− j))t ;
u− j(t)∗ =
α− jC− j(r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j))
2α2j C j +2α2− jC− j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
·
·(N−n0)e
1
2 (r−
√
r(r+4α2j C j+4α
2− jC− j))t .(C.6)
Eqs. (C.5) and (C.6) give Proposition 8.
D Value functions of variety expansion game
One also may compute the value function of the variety expansion game as the
optimized Hamiltonian function. The value of the variety expansion game for
the case of cooperative investments is the respective Hamiltonian function at time
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t = 0 and optimal co-state and variety values:
V LFj (n) =
1
r
H j(n(0)∗,λ j(0)∗) =
=C j ·
(N−n0)2(2α2− jC− j +α2j C j)
2α2− jC− j +2α2j C j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
;
V LF− j (n) =
1
r
H− j(n(0)∗,λ− j(0)∗) =
=C− j ·
(N−n0)2(2α2j C j +α2− jC− j)
2α2− jC− j +2α2j C− j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j +4α2− jC− j)
.(D.1)
In the case of no cooperation the value of the variety expansion does not include
the variables of the other firm:
V MONOj (n) =C j ·
(N−n0)2α2j C j
2α2j C j + r+
√
r(r+4α2j C j)
;
V MONO− j (n) =C− j ·
(N−n0)2α2− jC− j
2α2− jC− j + r+
√
r(r+4α2− jC− j)
.(D.2)
Since both C j and C− j are nonnegative, V LFj (n)>V MONOj (n) and V
LF− j (n)>V MONO− j (n).
The same applies to n(t) comparisons. This proves Proposition 9.
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